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Canadian Immigration Policy and Immigrant Economic Outcomes: 
Why the Differences in Outcomes between Sweden and Canada?
* 
 
Immigrants to Canada enjoy labour market outcomes that are more favourable than those for 
their counterparts in Sweden. In an effort to understand these gaps, Canada’s immigration 
policy and outcomes are contrasted to the Swedish immigration experience. The nature of 
immigration and structural differences involving the domestic labour markets are 
hypothesized to provide plausible explanations for at least some of the gap. Additionally, 
there are dynamic issues related to, for instance, the timing of immigrant entry with respect to 
the business cycle, and changes in the rates of immigration flows, that may have some 
impact on labour market outcomes and explain some short- to medium-term aspects of the 
gap in outcomes. On the other hand, common trends are also observed; both unemployment 
and earnings outcomes among entering immigrants have deteriorated significantly in Canada 
since the 1980s, as they have in many western countries including Sweden. 
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Much can be learned regarding immigration policy by studying cross-country differences in 
immigrant economic outcomes and their causes. Employment outcomes among immigrants to 
Canada tend to be superior to those of their counterparts in Sweden. However, the nature of 
immigration to the two countries differs and other structural differences involving the domestic 
labour market provide plausible explanations for at least some of the gap. Additionally, there are 
dynamic issues related to, for instance, the timing of immigrant entry with respect to the business 
cycle, and changes in the rates of immigration flows, that may have some impact on labour 
market outcomes and explain some short- to medium-term aspects of the gap in outcomes across 
countries. On the other hand, both unemployment and earnings outcomes among entering 
immigrants have deteriorated significantly in Canada since the 1980s, as they have in many 
western countries including Sweden.  
 
This paper describes the context of Canadian immigration and immigrants` labour market 
outcomes, and explores trends in both over time. Fortunately, there is a wealth of research 
regarding the question of why earnings have declined among immigrants to Canada. 
Employment outcomes of immigrants to Canada have been much less studied. In this latter case 
we are restricted to providing basic facts, and hypotheses regarding the causes of the Swedish-
Canadian differences mentioned above. This paper outlines potential causes of the observed gap 
in outcomes, to the extent that they are known, and asks what the implications might be for the 
Swedish experience. Of course, Canadian outcomes are in part a function of the institutional 
setting. As will be seen, it is likely that much of the difference in economic outcomes between 
the two countries is related to differences in immigration programs and policies. The paper ends 




Institutional Background  
 
Canada’s immigration system is quite complex, and is becoming increasingly so. With a federal 
governance structure – a federal government and provinces - there is substantial heterogeneity in 
the opinions and goals of the various actors involved in national discussions. This implies that 
the nation’s aggregate set of policies and programs are not always internally consistent. Indeed, 
there are many stresses between the sometimes complementary, but frequently competing, 
humanitarian, social, cultural, and economic goals of immigration policy. And there is frequently 
a lack of coordination, and sometimes disagreement, across levels of government and various 
actors within civil society regarding such issues as settlement services. With respect to highly 
skilled immigrants, for example, the federal government is responsible for the admission of 
health professionals, but provincial governments operate the healthcare systems and are 
responsible for the certification of those same professionals.  
 
Potentially useful for Sweden is a comparison of the alternative routes taken by Canada and the 
United States. Of particular interest are the differences in immigration levels, and the associated 
need to manage the immigration system, along with the active measures that may be beneficial 
for a smaller nation seeking economic benefit from immigration. Modern immigration policies 2 
 
and practices in North America date from the 1960s. Both Canada and the U.S. moved away 
from selection based mainly on source region, with most immigrants coming from Europe, to a 
more modern approach that resulted in large scale immigration from the developing world. But 
Canada took a very different path than the United States. As seen in figure 1, it consciously 
chose a significantly higher immigration rate, and it also developed a much more highly 
managed system. The U.S. receives a greater number of immigrants because it is a much larger 
nation, but on a per-capita basis, immigration is much higher in Canada. We believe these two 
features almost always go together in developed economies: the higher the rate of immigration, 
the greater is the need for structured government management. Canada's approach espoused 
immigrant selection with an emphasis on high skills, achieved through the introduction of a 
“points” system, and ethnic diversity, or at least race-neutrality. Federal multiculturalism policy 
was clearly articulated starting in the 1970s, and it follows naturally from the major revision to 
the immigration system in 1967 that introduced the points system. 
 
Figure 1 
Canadian and United States Immigration Rates Since 1940 
 
 
Source:  Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Facts and Figures (2009) and 
              US Citizenship and Immigration Services (http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis)  
 
 
Canada's immigration system has three main streams: economic, family reunification and 
refugee. Each major stream has subcategories (see appendix table 1) which have varied over the 
decades. In 2009, the majority of immigrants were in the economic class (63%). Along with 
others, this includes the “skilled worker” subcategory, the “principal applicants” of which are 
selected via the well known points system. Spouses and children of skilled worker principal 






















class (family reunification) constituted 27% of all immigrants and refugees 9%. The distribution 
of immigrants by class has shifted over time, with the economic class dominating since the mid-
1990s (figure 2). The increase in the relative size of the economic class is an effort to boost 
immigrant labour market outcomes to counteract the decline discussed below.  
 
Figure 2 
The Distribution of Immigration Categories Since 1980 
 
Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Facts and Figures, 2009 
 
Although Canada's immigration system is known for its points system, in 2009 only around 16% 
(see appendix table 1) of all immigrants, the principal applicants in the skilled worker class, were 
assessed by it. However, another approximately 22% of immigrants were the spouses and 
dependents of the skilled worker principal applicants, and there is a positive correlation between 
the educational attainment of the principal applicants and their spouses (Sweetman and Warman, 
2010a). This tends to keep educational attainment of immigrants high. 
 
There are also a variety of temporary resident/temporary foreign worker categories (for an 
introduction see Sweetman and Warman, 2010). Some temporary categories, such as the live-in-
caregiver and high skilled programs, are intended to allow transitions to permanent immigration, 
while others such as the seasonal agricultural worker program have very strict regulation with 
only a trivially low percentage of workers ever transiting to permanent status.  
 
The immigration system is currently undergoing significant change that appears to be driven by a 
number of goals including: (1) a desire to improve the economic outcomes of entering 
immigrants, given the deterioration since the 1980s,  (2) an attempt to better respond to short-
term regional labour market shortages often associated with commodity booms, and (3) a desire 
to shift immigration away from the three largest cities to other regions of the country that are 
seeking more economic immigrants. 
 
The temporary skilled worker program, whereby labour is brought into the country on a short-
term basis to help overcome regional labour shortages, has been used more in the 2000s than 4 
 
during previous periods (figure 3). The number of temporary foreign workers may well increase 
yet again once the recession is over and labour demand increases. In combination with this 
move, a new program, the “Canadian Experience Class”, has recently been initiated whereby the 
temporary foreign worker program (for high skilled workers) can explicitly bridge to permanent 
status.  This approach is in contrast to the use of a point system that effectively converts 
observable characteristics into a prediction regarding labour market success and admits 
individuals on that basis. The new approach gives employers (by extending job offers and 
arranging temporary work permits) and postsecondary institutions (by screening and admitting 
students) a greater role in the selection process. However, it avoids the type of prediction 
associated with the point system by requiring some potential immigrants who enter as temporary 
foreign workers to successfully secure employment in a high skilled occupation within a certain 
window of time. This new program also has a language requirement that is structured differently 




The Annual Flow of Temporary Residents to Canada Since 1985 
 
Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Facts and Figures, 2009 
 
Due to another policy shift, decisions regarding the selection of economic immigrants are 
increasingly being made in the provinces, rather than by the federal government. The “Provincial 
Nominee Program (PNP)” essentially allows provinces to select many of the immigrants- both in 
terms of number and characteristics- for their region, based on the needs as they see them. 
Employers often play a major role in this selection process, as pre-arranged jobs are in some 
cases required.  
 
The new “Canadian Experience Class”, the expanded “Provincial Nominee Program”, and the 
traditional points system operate side-by-side in selecting economic immigrants. This mixture is 
likely to continue, and the Canadian Experience Class and the PNP will likely grow, with a 
commensurate decline in the traditional points-based Skilled Worker program. There is some 
                                                 
1 first, it assesses English or French, as opposed to English and French in the Skilled worker program, and second, it 
is pass/fail and not an element of the points system that is combined with other factors in the assessment. 5 
 
debate regarding the likely effectiveness and longer term implications of these changes to the 
immigration program. 
 
Very recently, important legislative changes were put in place both to permit publically posted 
“Ministerial Instructions” from the Minister of the Department of Citizenship and Integration 
Canada to set priorities for processing and to allow officials to return applications to applicants 
without assessing the full application if certain basic criteria are not met. This is intended to 
enable better management of the intake of applications and the flow of immigrants.  
 
 
Does Immigrant Labour Market Adjustment Occur via Earnings or Employment? 
 
The pattern of immigrant economic assimilation observed in many immigrant-receiving 
countries is well-known; new immigrants' labour market outcomes are initially below those of 
observationally comparable domestic born workers, but over time their outcomes improve at a 
rate faster than those of the domestic born so that they "catch up" and even surpass their 
comparators. However, whether this improvement in outcomes is observed in terms of improved 
employment or wage outcomes is in part determined by the nature of domestic labour market 
institutions, as noted by Antecol, Kuhn and Trejo (2006). They compared immigrant outcomes in 
Australia, Canada and the United States. Among these countries, Australia has the greatest 
degree of labour market regulation (mostly in terms of wage rates) so that immigrant economic 
integration occurred mainly along the employment dimension in that country. In contrast, the 
United States has relatively little regulation of wage rates and a very modest social safety net 
(especially for undocumented immigrants) so that employment is relatively more important for 
subsistence; employment among new immigrants is consequently very high from the time of 
immigration, and integration occurs primarily along the earnings dimension. Canada is 
somewhere in between.  
 
Not surprisingly given these results, most economic analyses of immigrant labour market 
integration in Canada and the United States tends to focus on earnings, while the focus in 
Australia is on employment. It may be that Sweden more closely resembles Australia in terms of 
labour market regulation, contributing in part to the lower levels of employment among entering 
immigrants. The OECD has developed indicators of employment protection and labour market 
inflexibility. The index values for the US, Canada, Australia, and Sweden are, respectively: 0.85, 
1.02, 1.38, and 2.06.
2 Following are some data that suggest that these differences may be part of 
the explanation for the Swedish-Canada employment gap among immigrants. However, time 
does not permit us to seriously address this issue in this paper, so that it remains a question for 
future research. In this paper we focus on the assimilation of immigrants across both the 
employment and earnings dimensions.  
 
 
Economic Outcomes: A Focus on Employment  
 
The immigration system outlined above has resulted in Canadian immigrant flows since the early 
1990s that are characterized by very high levels of education, and very diverse source countries, 
                                                 
2 See http://www.oecd.org/document/34/0,3746,en_2649_37457_40917154_1_1_1_37457,00.html#epl.  6 
 
mainly developing nations. Just how well are these immigrants doing economically? Given that 
the policy debate in Sweden appears to be primarily focused on employment, we first turn to this 
measure. As noted earlier, most Canadian research has focused on immigrant earnings outcomes, 
rather than employment or unemployment. Hence, there is relatively little research to draw on for 
Canada. Some new data are provided by the authors. 
 
 
i)  Employment Outcomes in an International Context 
 
Placed in an international context, Canada appears to be doing very well regarding the 
employment outcomes of immigrants, and Sweden less so. A recent OECD international 
comparison of employment and unemployment rates among the native and foreign born in 
thirteen OECD countries (Liebig, 2009) found that relative outcomes (the foreign born relative to 
the native born) were among the worst in Sweden, and among the best in Canada (table 1). 
Focusing on men, only in Canada, the U.K. and the U.S. were aggregate employment rates in 
2007/2008 among the foreign born equal to or better than those of the native born, and 
unemployment rates similar among the two populations. Sweden displayed some of the poorer 
aggregate outcomes, along with Belgium, Denmark, Norway and Switzerland. In Sweden, the 
employment rate among the foreign born was 8.6 percentage points below that of the native 
born, and the unemployment rate was 2.5 times higher.  
 
These are aggregate data, and do not account for differences in age, educational attainment, 
language skills, years in the country, type of immigrant (economic or humanitarian refugee) and 
other important differences between immigrants and the native born, or between immigrants in 
different countries. As we will see, these factors significantly affect employment outcomes. One 
OECD study (OECD, Lemaitre and Liebig, 2007) did adjust the data for differences in age, 
educational attainment and marital status between immigrants and the native born in four 
countries, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the U.K.. Outcomes in Sweden, followed 
closely by the Netherlands, were the worst of this four country comparison. Using 2002 data for 
men, the adjusted results suggested that overall, the foreign born were only 0.36 times as likely 
to be employed as the native born, compared to 0.55 times as likely in Germany and the UK. 
And among the foreign born in the country for a year or less, they were only 0.13 times as likely 
to be employed in Sweden, compared to 0.24 times as likely in Germany, and 0.35 times as 
likely in the U.K. 
 
Why do aggregate employment and unemployment outcomes appear to be so much better in 
Canada (and other nations) than in Sweden? Given the dearth of research in Canada regarding 
employment and unemployment outcomes of immigrants, we cannot definitively answer this 
question here. However, a more careful description of immigrant employment outcomes in 
Canada, and to a lesser extent Sweden, will point us in the direction of potential explanations. 
 
 
ii)   Immigrant flows and outcomes, and economic conditions    
 
Economic conditions combined with the magnitude of the immigrant inflows obviously 
influence economic outcomes. Immigrants suffer a greater decline in outcomes during an 7 
 
economic downturn than do the native born (Aydemir 2003, Aydemir and Skuterud 2005). If 
inflows are large, and the economy suppressed, then immigrant outcomes will suffer. An OECD 
study of the labour market adjustment of Swedish immigrants points to this issue as at least part 
of the explanations of relatively poor immigrant economic outcomes in Sweden (OECD, 2007). 
Large scale immigration is a fairly recent phenomenon in Sweden. In 2002, over 35% of the 
foreign-born working age population had entered during the previous ten years. In Canada, the 
number was about one quarter. And in Sweden a trivial share of these comprised “economic” 
immigrants; 60% to 80% were humanitarian immigrants and their families (OECD 2007). As 
noted above, the opposite is true in Canada, with economic immigrants dominating the inflow 
since the 1990s. Humanitarian immigrants have a much more difficult time obtaining a job, 
whether in Canada or Sweden. 
 
Table 1 
Labour force characteristics of the native- and foreign-born populations, 15-64 years old, 
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  3.0 
3.8 
  5.8  
6.7 
 2.9 
  6.4  
7.7 





 2.4  
1.1  
2.8 
 0.9  
2.7 




Sweden   14.0   79.6  83.0  70.8   79.4  8.6  11.0    4.4    2.5  
Switzerland   26.0   88.3    88.2  83.2   86.4  3.2  5.8    2    2.9  
United Kingdom   13.0   83.3    82.6  77.8    77.6   -0.2  6.5    6.1    1.1  
United States   16.8   86.4    77.8  81.8    73.4   -8.4  5.4    5.7   0.9  
               
OECD above-mentioned 
countries
1   15.5   81.0    82.0  74.3    78.3   4.0  8.3    4.5   1.8  
               
Women                
Austria   18.4   62.0    70.7  56.7    67.8   11.1  8.5   4.0    2.1  
Australia   27.6   62.2    72  58.9    68.7   9.8  5.2    4.5    1.2  
Belgium   11.9   50.3    62.5  42.4    57.8   15.4  15.7    7.5    2.1  
Canada   22.1   69.3    74.3  63.9    69.7   5.8  7.9    6.2    1.3  
Denmark   10.1   63.5    78.7  59.8    75.5   15.7  5.8   4.0   1.5  
France   12.0   58.3    67.1  50.2    62.2   12.0  13.9    7.3    1.9  
Germany   15.1   61.4    72.1  53.1    66.3   13.2  13.5    8.0   1.7  
Netherlands   13.6   61.9    74.7  58.1    72.8   14.7  6.1    2.6    2.3  
Norway   9.4   72.7   77.3  69.3    75.6   6.3  4.6   2.2    2.1  
Sweden   16.2   67.8   80  59.6   76   16.4  12   4.9    2.4  
Switzerland   26.6   70.5  76.7  64.3   74.2   9.9  8.8    3.2    2.8  
United Kingdom   13.4   62.6   70.5  57.8   66.9   9.1  7.7   5.1    1.5  
United States   15.6   62.1  69  59.1   65.8   6.7  4.8   4.6    1.0  
               
OECD above-mentioned 
countries
1   16.3   63.4   72.7  57.9   69.2   11.2  8.8   4.9   1.8  
Note: Data for European countries refer to third quarter (Q3) except for Germany and Switzerland where they refer to 2007 annual data. Source: European Union 
Labour Force Survey, except for the United States (Current Population Survey March Supplement), Canada 2006 Census, Australia2006 Labour Force Survey Data. 
Register data: Statistics Norway (Labour Market Statistics). Data refer to the unweighted average Source: Liebig, 2009 
 
The large inflow of humanitarian immigrants in Sweden was accompanied by a prolonged 
economic slump. The unemployment rate rose from around 2% in 1990, to around 10% through 
the 1993 to 1997 level, before falling to 5% to 8% during the 2000s, still high by historical 8 
 
standards in Sweden. Even more striking was the drop in the Swedish employment rate in the 
mid-1990s. Male employment rates of both the native and foreign born were affected, but the 
latter much more so. For example, data up to 2003 show that among the foreign born residing in 
Sweden for four years or less, employment rates fell from around 60% in 1990 to 30% by the 
mid 1990s, and recovered, but only to around 50% in the early 2000s. Similar declines are 
observed among all other immigrant groups, including those in the country for 20 years or more. 
Over the 1990s the employment rates for this latter group fell from over 80% before the 
economic downturn to 70%, even after the recovery in the early 2000s. Similar patterns were 
observed for women. A prolonged economic downturn, combined with a large increase in 
immigration, can affect outcomes, not only during the downturn, but for years following. 
 
An increase in immigration, associated with an economic downturn, appears to have occurred 
again in the late 2000s in Sweden. Annual immigrant inflows to Sweden were at their highest 
level between 2006 and 2009 at about 0.9% of the population. Similar numbers were seen only 
during the early 1990s, at around 0.85% of the population. These intake levels are higher than 
those typically registered in Canada, which has one of the highest immigration rates in the 
western world. The Swedish unemployment rate was between 6% and 7% between 2006 and 
2008, but then rose to over 8% in the recession of 2008 and 2009. These periods of high 
humanitarian immigrant inflows, combined with a labour market that is registering relatively 
high unemployment by Swedish historical standards, may be part of the explanation of the 
relatively poor employment outcomes among immigrants, as suggested by the OECD (2007). 
 
Figure 4 





































































































































But what about Canada? How does it fair in the same kind of analysis? Canada’s labour market 
has traditionally functioned in a somewhat different manner than that of Sweden. The labour 
market was one of traditionally higher unemployment, but with more and shorter spells of 
unemployment. That is, it was seen, along with the U.S. labour market, as being more flexible 
than that of many European nations. Jobs are both more easily found and lost. Over the 1980s, 
unemployment in Sweden was in the 2% to 4% range, and in Canada, between 8% and 12%. But 
Canada’s unemployment fell over the 1990s and 2000s, while in Sweden it rose (figure 4). The 
result is that unemployment in the two economies looked very similar over the 1990s and 2000s. 9 
 
But what we do not know is whether labour market flexibility increased in Sweden over this 
period to the point where it matched that of North American labour markets. A more flexible 
labour market makes it easier for unemployed immigrants (and others) to break into 
employment, even if they experience some short spells of unemployment. 
 
Regarding immigrant inflows, in general they were higher in Canada than Sweden, at 0.6% to 
0.8% of the population in Canada, and 0.4% to 0.9% in Sweden (figure 5). Inflows are more 
variable in Sweden; this variability may be an issue if the provision of settlement services and 
language training does not adjust sufficiently quickly, and especially if refugees require 
additional public services compared to economic immigrants. On the surface it would appear that 
Canada more successfully absorbed higher inflows of immigrants over the 1990s and 2000s than 
Sweden, with a labour market that registered about the same level of unemployment as observed 
in Sweden. However, very high intake during periods of weak economic conditions in Sweden 
may have played an important role. Also, as noted, this is a superficial analysis, since the 
unemployment rate alone does not provide much information on many important aspects of the 
labour market, including its degree of labour mobility and flexibility. There may be significant 
differences between the two countries in this regard that play an important role in immigrant 
economic assimilation. Although Sweden does not have as inflexible a labour market as some 
European nations, and Sweden invests significantly in active labour market programs, it appears 
that the labour market is not as flexible as the Canadian one.  
 
Figure 5  
Immigration rates in Canada and Sweden 
 
 
Perhaps the answer lies with the types of immigrants that are entering the two countries. Among 
immigrants, employment outcomes vary across a number of dimensions, including immigrant 
class (e.g. economic, family reunification, or refugee), length of time in the country, and 
educational attainment. The immigrants to the two countries differ dramatically across these 
dimensions. As noted earlier, the Canadian system is much more “managed”, with higher levels 































































































ii)   Employment Outcomes by Immigrant Class 
 
Xue (2010) used the Canadian Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants
3 to explore the employment 
outcomes of immigrants during their first four years in Canada. This survey tracked a sample of 
immigrants for four years. Surveys were conducted at 6 months, two years and four years after 
landing in 2000. The employment data refer to the males and females aged 15 and older. 
 
The employment to population ratio (i.e. the employment rate) increased appreciably with time 
spent in Canada. Four years after arrival 68% of immigrants were employed (appendix table 2). 
But there is significant variation by immigrant class. Refugees and family class immigrants had 
the lowest employment rates. Six months after arrival, only 22% of refugees and 41% of the 
family class were employed, compared to 62% of the skilled economic class immigrants 
(principal applicants). After four years employment levels improved, but the rate remained much 
lower among refugees and the family class at around 55%, than among the skilled economic 
class at 84%, and their spouses at 65%. As noted above, immigration to Canada is dominated by 
the economic class, while Swedish Immigration more closely resembles the refugee and family 
classes, which register lower employment rates.  
 
Knowing only whether an immigrant is employed provides limited information. Xue (2010) 
decomposed employment into full and part-time work (appendix table 2).
4 Among those 
employed, skilled workers assessed by the point system were more likely to work full-time (at 
87% employed), with the family class next (at 77%). There is relatively little difference among 
the three remaining classes (at around 70%). These data indicate that refugees register the most 
rapid improvement in outcomes following the initial period in Canada, and the fact that their 
employment rates are equal to those of the family class after four years is encouraging. 
 
If immigration to Canada was restricted to refugees and the family class, which more closely 
resemble the majority of Swedish immigration, then the differential in employment outcomes 
                                                 
3   At the first interview the response rate was just over 60 percent (this follows from the need to both locate 
individuals and have them agree to be surveyed), and of those who responded at the first interview, about 65 
percent continued through to the third wave. In addition to the usual reasons for non-response, both return 
and/or onward migration are issues for the sample in question since the survey is restricted to those residing in 
Canada. Although there is a small debate about the magnitude of these estimates, with some people believing 
them to be slightly high, Aydemir and Robinson (2008) suggest that almost 25 percent of all new immigrants 
leave the country within five years, with over 80 percent of those departing doing so in the first year after 
landing. Moreover, given that all respondents in the LSIC landed from abroad (as opposed to landing within 
Canada), the national return and onward migration rate is likely to underestimate departures in the survey’s 
sample since the Economic Class had to apply through a mission abroad at the time of the survey and are also 
more likely to depart, whereas refugee claimants may land within the country and are more likely to stay. 
Aydemir and Robinson find that around 25 percent of immigrants who arrived under the skilled worker class 
left within the first year after arrival, and that four years after landing (which would correspond to wave 3 in our 
data), around 33 percent had left. Xue employs the weights provided by Statistics Canada throughout in an 
effort to make the sample representative. 
4   Full-time work was defined as 30 hours per week or greater. 11 
 
between the two countries would be significantly less. This fact can be demonstrated by focusing 
on the outcomes of refugees in comparison to that of immigrants (foreign born) as a whole. In 
Sweden, among persons aged 20 to 64 in 2008, the employment rate among refugees was 53.7%, 
and among other immigrants, 57.1%. Since refugees and family reunification classes dominated 
immigration, there was little difference between the employment rates of all immigrants, and 
those of refugees. In Canada, however, using the data just reported, we see that among those 
aged 15 plus, four years after entering the employment rate is 56% for refugees compared to 
68% for all immigrants. The latter number is raised by the inclusion of a large number of 
economic migrants and their spouses. 
 
 
iii)   Employment Rates Among the Less and More Highly Educated Immigrants 
 
Immigrants to Canada are very highly educated by any standard. Since economic class skilled 
principal applicants are selected in part based on education, it is not too surprising that 
educational attainment is high among this group. But the educational attainment of many of the 
other groups is also high. Unfortunately, available data on education by class refers to the 
population aged 15 plus. Since a significant share of this group (the very young) has not 
completed their education, these numbers underestimate the educational attainment of the adult 
population. Nonetheless, they provide an idea of the relative levels. 
 
Among skilled principal applicants aged 15 plus, that is the immigrants who are selected based 
on the points system, 78% of those admitted between 2000 and 2007 had a university degree. If 
anything, the educational attainment of immigrants has risen since then, due to changes in the 
points system. A large share of these immigrants had master’s degrees or PhDs. Among the 
spouses of skilled principal applicants, about one half had degrees, as did 27% of spouses among 
the family reunification class. Thirteen percent of refugees had university degrees. Overall, these 
data suggest 45% of all immigrants to Canada held a university degree. If one includes only the 
population aged 25 to 54, the share is around 60% for men, and 51% for women. 
  
This fact significantly affects employment rates. Among long-term immigrants (in Canada for 20 
years or more), employment rates among the male population aged 25 to 64 were 65% among 
those with less than high school graduation, 77% among high school graduates, and 84% among 
university graduates (table 2). Similar differences are observed among immigrants with fewer 
years in Canada. The variation among women was much greater, ranging from 47% among those 
with less than high school graduation to 78% among university graduates. Clearly if immigration 
to Canada consisted largely of the less educated, the employment population ratios would be 
much bleaker. 
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Table 2  












University 68.5 79.2 81.4 84.8 81.0 85.5
Other pose‐secondary 67.8 73.8 78.6 80.5 77.0 80.2
High school graduation 58.4 66.9 69.4 71.4 71.5 75.3
Less than high school 46.8 50.9 58.3 60.7 55.5 56.6
Total 65.2 73.3 75.3 77.3 73.8 77.2
Men
University 77.3 86.1 85.1 88.5 84.2 87.0
Other pose‐secondary 79.0 81.8 83.6 84.4 80.3 82.7
High school graduation 73.1 80.8 80.0 80.2 77.6 79.9
Less than high school 69.9 74.4 74.5 70.1 65.3 64.0
Total 76.7 83.4 82.6 82.9 78.9 80.2
Women
University 59.7 71.5 77.4 80.9 77.6 84.2
Other pose‐secondary 58.2 67.5 74.3 76.9 73.7 77.7
High school graduation 47.9 56.3 60.7 63.4 66.3 70.7
Less than high school 32.1 36.1 47.8 51.6 47.3 46.9









(iv)   Language differences may play a role 
 
Language is one of the most important determinants of the speed and quality of labour market 
adjustment among entering immigrants to any culture (e.g., Ferrer, Green and Riddell, 2006). 
But the pool of potential migrants around the work who speak Swedish is extremely limited, at 
least outside the Nordic countries. Thus, special effort is needed to instruct new immigrants in 
the Swedish language, and this effort may take time, delaying labour market integration.  
 
Canada is in a much more favourable position. There is a very large pool of potential migrants 
who have some prior knowledge of, or experience with, at least one of the two official languages 
of Canada, English or French. Even though immigration to Canada has moved away from 
Europe towards Asia and Africa, there remain a large number of immigrants who have acquired 
some knowledge of English or French before entry. During the 2000s, over half of entering 
immigrants had some knowledge of English or French (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 
2010). This result is in part because language is one of the selection criteria for economic 
immigrants. A deterioration in the knowledge of English or French among immigrants associated 
with the movement away from Canada’s traditional source countries towards Asia and Africa is 
one of the major explanations of the deterioration in economic outcomes, as we will see in the 13 
 
next section. To counter this movement, a more stringent language test was introduced in the mid 
2000s, one that economic migrants must now pass before being admitted to Canada. 
 
 
 (v)  But Relative Unemployment Outcomes Deteriorated in Canada Since the 1980s 
 
Although recent employment outcomes among immigrants to Canada appear to be quite good by 
international standards, relative unemployment outcomes have deteriorated since the 1980s.
5 
This deterioration occurred in spite of the dramatic increase in the educational attainment of 
immigrants. In 1980s about 10% of entering immigrants aged 15 plus had a degree, and by 2008 
it was 45%. Much of this increase occurred in the 1990s. 
 
Table 3 
Unemployment rates by entering cohort and years in Canada, immigrants aged 25-64 
Unemployment rates Relative to the Canadian born
cohort <= 56 ‐10 11‐15 16‐20 >20 cohort <= 56 ‐10 11‐15 16‐20 >20
Women
1976‐80 0.083 0.104 0.098 0.086 0.046 1976‐80 1.15 1.05 1.10 1.08 0.82
1981‐85 0.138 0.126 0.103 0.061 0.044 1981‐85 1.40 1.40 1.30 1.08 0.90
1986‐90 0.168 0.133 0.070 0.058 1986‐90 1.87 1.68 1.24 1.17
1991‐95 0.188 0.087 0.071 1991‐95 2.37 1.54 1.45
1996‐2000 0.136 0.082 1996‐2000 2.42 1.66
2001‐2005 0.129 2001‐2006 2.62
Men
1976‐80 0.043 0.070 0.081 0.071 0.043 1976‐80 0.84 0.85 0.92 0.82 0.67
1981‐85 0.104 0.101 0.083 0.049 0.039 1981‐85 1.27 1.14 0.96 0.77 0.75
1986‐90 0.153 0.104 0.057 0.046 1986‐90 1.73 1.20 0.89 0.88
1991‐95 0.145 0.068 0.049 1991‐95 1.68 1.06 0.95
1996‐2000 0.099 0.055 1996‐2000 1.55 1.05
2001‐2006 0.084 2001‐2006 1.60
Years in Canada Years in Canada
Source: Canadian Census 
 
Among men, the unemployment rate among immigrants entering during the late 1970s was lower 
during their first five years in Canada (i.e., “recent” immigrants) than the rate among the 
Canadian born (table 3 – lower panel). But this relative (to the Canadian-born) unemployment 
rate rose with successive cohorts of entering immigrants. During their first five years in Canada, 
the relative rate among the late 1970s entering cohort was 0.84, but had reached 1.60 among the  
early 2000s entering cohort
6 (i.e., the unemployment rate among “recent” immigrants was 1.6 
times that of the Canadian born).  
                                                 
5    The unemployment rate of immigrants relative to the Canadian born is a more useful measure than the 
unemployment rate itself, since the former implicitly controls for business cycle fluctuations by using the 
native-born unemployment rate as the benchmark, although immigrants may be somewhat more sensitive to the 
business cycle. It also controls for any policy changes that may influence unemployment in the same way. 
6   There was some improvement in the late 1990s which was likely associated with the rapid rise in educational 
attainment and the increasing share in the skilled economic class during that period ( Picot and Hou, 2009). 14 
 
 
Among women (table 3 – upper panel), the deterioration was more significant. The relative 
unemployment rate rose continuously between the late 1970s entering cohort, and the early 
2000s cohort. During the first five years in Canada, the unemployment rate of women entering 
during the late 1970s was 1.15 times that of the Canadian born, and among the early 2000s 
cohort, it was 2.62.  
 
Outcomes measured by the employment population ratio (i.e., the employment rate) demonstrate 
less of a decline. Among men, the relative employment rate fell between the late 1970s entering 
cohort and the early 1990s cohort from 1.03 to .87, but since then has recovered to .97 (table 4). 
Thus, among the early 2000s entering cohort the aggregate employment rate was roughly equal 
to that of the Canadian born. As with the unemployment rate, the story among women was less 
positive. Employment rates among women in the early 2000s immigrant cohort during their first 
five years in Canada were only 79 percent of the rate among Canadian born women: notably, this 
was a decline from 103 percent among the late 1970s entering cohort. 
 
Table 4 
Employment rates by entering cohort and years in Canada, immigrants aged 25-64
Employment rates Relative to the Canadian born
cohort <= 56 ‐10 11‐15 16‐20 >20 cohort <= 56 ‐10 11‐15 16‐20 >20
Women
1976‐80 0.569 0.638 0.698 0.700 0.660 1976‐80 1.09 1.11 1.08 1.05 0.94
1981‐85 0.551 0.640 0.656 0.725 0.674 1981‐85 0.96 0.99 0.98 1.03 0.93
1986‐90 0.568 0.603 0.700 0.729 1986‐90 0.88 0.90 0.99 1.01
1991‐95 0.488 0.635 0.691 1991‐95 0.73 0.90 0.95
1996‐2000 0.544 0.658 1996‐2000 0.77 0.91
2001‐2005 0.574 2001‐2005 0.79
Men
1976‐80 0.886 0.877 0.864 0.833 0.806 1976‐80 1.03 1.06 1.06 1.05 0.99
1981‐85 0.803 0.832 0.818 0.855 0.805 1981‐85 0.97 1.02 1.03 1.05 0.99
1986‐90 0.740 0.781 0.844 0.858 1986‐90 0.91 0.98 1.04 1.05
1991‐95 0.688 0.809 0.841 1991‐95 0.87 1.00 1.03
1996‐2000 0.756 0.839 1996‐2000 0.93 1.03
2001‐2005 0.795 2001‐2005 0.97
Years in Canada Years in Canada
 
Source: Canadian Census 
 
Canada has not escaped the general decline in the economic outcome among immigrants 
observed in most western nations. More recent entering cohorts of immigrants to Canada are 
having greater relative unemployment difficulties than their earlier entering counterparts, despite 
their higher educational levels and the fact that more of them are in the skilled economic class. 
The decline is much less evident when measured by employment rates, but as we will see in the 
next section, it is particularly evident in the earnings of employed immigrants. Immigrants to 
Canada are finding employment, but their jobs are paying less than previously. The reasons for 
the deterioration in the relative unemployment rates are not known since virtually no serious 15 
 
research has been done in Canada on this specific issue. However, a significant body of research 
has developed around the decline in entry earnings of immigrants, and its causes. 
 
 
The Deterioration in Entry Earnings among Immigrants to Canada 
 
In many immigrant receiving countries, the labour market outcomes of new immigrants have 
declined very appreciably across entry cohorts (e.g., for Canada see, Aydemir and Skuterude, 
2005; Frenette and Morisette, 2005; Green and Worswick, 2010; Picot, 2008; Sweetman, 2010; 
Sweetman and Warman, 2008). This is probably one of Canada's major social policy 
conundrums. There has been a concurrent increase in poverty rates among immigrants as 
depicted in figure 6. In 1980 the percentage of immigrants and the Canadian born with annual 
incomes below Canada’s “Low-Income Cut-off” (LICO) were comparable. Abstracting from the 
short-term fluctuations associated with the business cycle, it is clear that the trends for the 
Canadian born and immigrants are going in opposite directions, with poverty rising among 
immigrants, and falling among the Canadian born. These poverty trends are driven primarily by 
changes in annual labour market earnings among immigrants and the Canadian born (Picot, Hou 
and Coulombe, 2009; Picot, Lu and Hou, 2009). It is also worth noting that the magnitude of the 
“sawtooth” is greater for immigrants than the Canadian born, with the former being more 
sensitive to the business cycle.  
 
Figure 6  
 Pre-Tax, Post-Transfer Low-Income Rates for Canada from 1980 to 2005 
 
Source: Based on data from Picot, Lu and Hou, 2009 
 
Among immigrants with jobs, those who arrived during the late 1970s had good earnings 
outcomes relatively quickly after landing. However, subsequent arrival cohorts have had 
increasingly lower earnings at entry, with the cumulative effect being dramatic. When male 
immigrants are compared to the Canadian-born with similar characteristics (i.e. education, age, 
marital status, etc.), the cohort entering during the late 1970s had annual earnings during their 16 
 
first five years in Canada that were roughly 85% of that of their Canadian born counterparts 
(more specifically, the log of the ratio of immigrant to Canadian-born earnings was 0.85). After 
11 to 15 years in Canada, this cohort earned around 92% of that of comparable Canadian-born.  
 
Among the early 1990s entering male  cohort, entry earnings fell to about 60% of that of 
comparable Canadian-born (i.e., log earnings ratio of 0.60) during the first five years in Canada, 
rising to only about 78% after 11 to 15 years in Canada (figure 7). There was some improvement 
during the late 1990s entering cohort, but this was followed by deterioration again in the early 
2000s.  And while there is some indication that the growth rate of earnings immediately post-
immigration has increased among more recent entering cohorts, they may not catch up to their 
domestically born counterparts during their working lifetime (figure 7). Similar trends are 
observed for women.  
 
Several reasons for the decline have been observed (see Picot and Sweetman 2005, Reitz, 2007 
and Picot 2008 for reviews of the decline and its causes). During the early stages of the decline 
in the 1970s and 80s, changing source countries played a major role. There was a movement in 
immigration away from the traditional source regions such as Western Europe, the U.S and 
Australia towards Asian, African and Caribbean countries. A bundle of characteristics that are 
difficult to disentangle follow from this: notably issues with language skills, educational quality, 
cultural differences, possibly ethnical/racial discrimination, etc.  
 
Figure 7 
Earnings* of Immigrants Compared to those of Comparable Canadian-Born, 
Full-Time Full-Year Workers aged 16 to 64, Males 
 
Source: Census of Population. *  Predicted values based on a model  
  
The second reason for the decline is related to a significant fall in the economic rate of return to 
pre-immigration labour market experience. This occurred mainly during the 1980s and 1990s. In 
the 1970s individuals who immigrated with, say, 20 years of labour market experience were 
treated, in terms of earnings, like Canadians with a similar amount of labour market experience. 
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countries, like new labour market entrants, no matter how much foreign work experience they 
have. The labour market does not financially reward their pre-immigration labour market 
experience. 
 
Third, and related to the second phenomenon, all new labour market entrants, both Canadian and 
foreign born, have seen a decline in their entry earnings, with most of this change happening in 
the 1980s. In this case, the decline had nothing to do with their immigration status. Rather, all 
new labour market entrants (particularly males), including immigrants, experienced a decline in 
labour market entry earnings in Canada, for reasons that remain largely unknown.  
 
Fourth, post-2000 there was a very substantial "IT-bust" in North America and parts of Europe. 
A historically high number of entering immigrants were concentrated in computer science and 
engineering disciplines during the late 1990s and early 2000s, as immigration responded to the 
need for more “high-tech” workers during the high tech boom of the late 1990s. During the bust 
of the early 2000s, these immigrants were particularly hard hit. Moreover, immigrants tend to 
have lower employer seniority and therefore experienced more negative consequences in sector-
specific downturns such as this from which there appears to be little rebound.  
 
Interestingly, there is much popular discussion, and many government programs, addressing the 
issue of academic credential recognition among new immigrants. However, the empirical data 
suggests that there has been only a modest change in the rate of return to foreign credentials in 
Canada (e.g., Ferrer and Riddell, 2008) – although there may have been a recent decline 
associated with the IT collapse in the early 2000s when the rate of return to higher education fell 
for many immigrants (Picot and Hou, 2009). In general, immigrants do receive a somewhat 
lower rate of return to pre-immigration education, but this has always been the case and is not a 
significant source of the decline in labour market outcomes. Furthermore, credential recognition 
issues are usually associated with professional occupations such as medicine, accounting, 
engineering and so on. These occupations account for such a relatively small share of all 
immigrants to Canada that even if credentialism issues disappeared, concerns with low earnings 
among immigrants would remain. Nevertheless, credential recognition is a real issue for 
particular groups of immigrants, and is an appropriate policy lever to pull to improve outcomes.  
 
Perhaps most importantly, language skills appear to mediate the rate of return to formal 
education. Immigrants with good language skills in English or French can much more easily 
convert their education to earnings than those with poor skills. A recent paper (Bonikowska, 
Green and Riddell, 2009) has shown that the rate of return to English and French language skills 
is very similar for immigrants and the Canadian born. That is, when literacy skills in English or 
French are accounted for, immigrants earn about what one would expect, and have earnings 
similar to their comparable Canadian born counterparts. The allocation of language skills 
explains a considerable portion of the immigrant-native born earnings gap. Overall, language 
skills appear to have a significant direct and indirect influence on labour market outcomes, and 
are key to positive outcomes. 
 
Given the body of research that identifies the magnitude of, and explains the various reasons for, 
the decline in immigrant labour market outcomes, Canadian policymakers and others have 
focussed some of their attention on this issue. This has included changes to the immigrant 
selection rules, the strengthening of language tests, the introduction of new programs as 18 
 
mentioned earlier, increasing the share of immigrants in the economic class, and beefing up 
immigrant settlement programs. These changes have resulted in some successes, although space 
does not allow a full review here. It seems likely that aggregate outcomes would be poorer 
without some of these changes. 
 
 
Discussion and Conclusions  
 
Immigrants to Canada enjoy economic outcomes that are more favourable than those for their 
counterparts in Sweden. But Canada has not escaped the deterioration in outcomes that is 
observed since the 1980s in most western immigrant receiving countries, including Sweden.  
 
Although more research would be required to confirm the following hypotheses, the Canada-
Sweden comparison identifies several plausible factors that may be influencing the outcomes 
observed in Sweden.  
 
1)  Differences in the types of immigrants entering the two countries are important. Canada’s 
immigrants possess characteristics that are much more amenable to positive labour 
market outcomes than do those who arrive at Sweden’s border. They are for the most part 
highly educated and much more likely to be “economic” immigrants. Sweden’s 
immigrants are more likely to be humanitarian/refugees with much less education. These 
differences are at least in part the result of Canada’s more managed immigration system, 
which, as described above, has taken a decidedly "high skills" route. Since the late 1960s, 
the emphasis in Canada has been on ensuring that a significant share of immigrants 
possess characteristics that would assist them in labour market assimilation. And this 
emphasis has increased since the early 1990s, when research started to demonstrate that 
economic outcomes were deteriorating. 
 
2)  Large scale immigration is a more recent phenomenon in Sweden than Canada, resulting 
in many more recent immigrants who have had less time to adjust. If comparisons are 
made without allowing for differences in "years since migration" and the associated 
economic integration, Canada will appear to have superior outcomes simply because it 
has a higher percentage of immigrants who have had a longer period of time in which to 
integrate economically. 
 
3)  The empirical evidence for Canada suggests that some skill in the host country language 
is a crucial factor in successful economic integration. While language skills accumulate 
with time in the country, so that the aforementioned "years since migration" is relevant, it 
also seems plausible that a higher percentage of Canadian immigrants have some 
familiarity with English/French prior to immigration than is the case with respect to 
Swedish for immigrants to Sweden. Canada's points system also puts an emphasis on 
English and French language ability at the time of immigration.  
 
4)  Labour market rigidity may also be an issue. Over the 1990s and 2000s Canada and 
Sweden displayed a similar unemployment rate, but Canada appears to have been able to 
absorb a higher per capita number of immigrants with superior employment outcomes. 19 
 
Whether this result is entirely due to the differences in immigrant characteristics noted 
above is not known. But there is some reason to believe that a more flexible Canadian 
labour market had an effect. Relative employment rates among immigrants to America 
appear to be higher than among their Canadian counterparts, and Canadian rates are 
higher than their Swedish counterparts. Potential labour market rigidities associated with 
hiring and firing, wage settlement, the availability of social security, minimum wage 
laws, and other institutional features may favour the United States, and to a lesser extent 
Canada, regarding the ability of immigrants to at least locate a job. Whether the job is a 
“good” one, and in any way matches the skills and abilities of the immigrant, is another 
issue. 
 
It seems plausible that in more rigid labour markets, the economic integration of new 
immigrants occurs more on the employment than the earnings dimension, whereas, in a 
more flexible labour market employment is more rapid following immigration and 
economic integration occurs along the earnings dimension. Although no formal studies 
comparing Canada and Sweden have been undertaken on this topic, this hypothesis is 
consistent with evidence across the United States, Canada and Australia -- three countries 
spanning a wide range of labour market rigidities. According to the OECD's index, 
Sweden is more rigid than Australia, which is the most rigid of these three.  
 
5)  Related to the previous point, it may well be that the generosity of the Swedish social 
safety net does not "push" individuals into the labour market for subsistence purposes in 
the same way as might the American social safety net, and even the Canadian one to a 
lesser degree.  
 
6)  There is some Canadian evidence that immigrants are more sensitive to the business 
cycle than are the Canadian born, and immigrants who arrived in the early 1990s appear 
to have been scarred by their mid-recession arrival. It is plausible that this type of 
phenomenon is also occurring in Sweden, which had a substantial and prolonged 
recession in the 1990s as seen in figure 4, after which the unemployment rate did not 
return to its previously low level. In contrast, before the 2008 recession the Canadian 
unemployment rate was at lows not seen in the previous 30 or 40 years – and the data 
being analyzed are pre-recession. 
 
7)  The Swedish immigration rate increased dramatically around 2005 and stayed quite high 
subsequently. Beyond the labour market’s ability to integrate new immigrants, a sudden 
increase in numbers may affect the provision, and the quality, of settlement services, 
including language training. It might not be the long-term immigration level that is 
relevant for this issue, but the rapid increase in the number of individuals requiring 
services may strain resources. 
 
Having itemized these potential sources of the observed immigrant labour market outcomes in 
Sweden, it is worth recognizing that Canada's immigration policy is far from static. Canada’s 
immigration system is in the midst of significant change, in part because of some unhappiness 
with the economic outcomes among recent immigrants. The ability of the “points” system to 
deliver the type of immigrant who can easily adapt in the labour market is being questioned in 20 
 
Canada, as it has been in Australia. This criticism is still being made despite the apparent 
considerable improvement in outcomes among more recent “economic” migrants following the 
changes made to the points system in the early 2000s. 
 
There are multiple approaches to understanding the definition of "high skills". 
Defining/evaluating such skills in the context of an administrative immigration system – such as 
a points system – in a way that is transparent and equitable is not straightforward. Related to this, 
not all skills are easily transferable from one context to another. Host country language ability 
appears to be an extremely important moderator of educational and labour market skills. 
Moreover, international educational credentials have extremely imprecise predictive power 
regarding labour market success. These issues are often discussed within the context of the 
points system. The move to involve employers and the provinces more in the selection process 
through the “Canadian Experience Class” and the “Provincial Nominee Program” are in part 
responses to these concerns. 
 
Nonetheless, in spite of these concerns, Canada’s managed immigration system has allowed a 
very large number of immigrants – among the highest rate in the world – to integrate in a 
relatively successful manner, both socially and economically. Canada has so far escaped the 
social unrest associated with first and second generation immigration in most other western 
nations, at least in part because of the types of immigrants entering the country. There are of 
course non-economic reasons for this outcome as well. And, when evaluating the success of 
immigration policy in the very long run by focusing on the outcomes of the one-and-a-half (i.e., 
very young immigrants) and second generation immigrants, Canada appears to shine (e.g., 
Aydemir and Sweetman 2008, Picot and Hou 2010, Schaafsma and Sweetman 2001). Again at 
least in part because of the types of immigrants entering the country, educational and labour 
market outcomes among the children of immigrants are very positive, often much better than that 
of their counterparts with Canadian born parents. The managed immigration system has been, 
overall, very helpful to Canada. 
 
Any country thinking of reforming its immigration system would do well to undertake a large-
scale detailed international comparative study of relevant comparator countries’ processes and 
policies. Some of the relevant issues are well captured by the academic literature, but many are 
not. The academic literature in Canada is only starting to look at the details of the operation of 
the immigration selection and settlement system(s) and their ramifications for labour market 
outcomes and social integration. And one dimension of immigration that has not been discussed 
here, the effect on the labour market outcomes of domestically born workers, has been almost 
completely ignored in Canada in both academic and policy circles. While constituting a central 
question in most western nations, it is rarely discussed in Canada, and has received very little 
research attention.  
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Appendix table 1 
Table A1 - Immigration to Canada by Class in 2009     




        
Economic Class immigrants       
Canadian Experience   - principal applicants  1,775  0.7  1.2 
   Class  - spouses & dependants  770  0.3  0.5 
Skilled workers   - principal applicants  40,735  16.2  26.5 
  (PAs-points system)  - spouses & dependants  55,227  21.9  36.0 
Entrepreneurs   - principal applicants  372  0.1  0.2 
  - spouses & dependants  943  0.4  0.6 
Self-employed  - principal applicants  179  0.1  0.1 
  - spouses & dependants  358  0.1  0.2 
Investors  - principal applicants  2,872  1.1  1.9 
  - spouses & dependants  7,435  2.9  4.8 
Provincial/territorial   - principal applicants  11,801  4.7  7.7 
   nominees  - spouses & dependants  18,577  7.4  12.1 
Live-in caregivers  - principal applicants  6,273  2.5  4.1 
  - spouses & dependants  6,181  2.5  4.0 
Sub-total   153,498  60.9  100.0 
        
Family Class          
Spouses and partners   43,894  17.4  67.3 
Sons and daughters     3,027  1.2  4.6 
Parents and grandparents   17,179  6.8  26.3 
Others     1,100  0.4  1.7 
Sub-total    65,200 25.8  100.0 
        
Refugees         
Government-assisted refugees   7,425  2.9  32.5 
Privately sponsored refugees   5,036  2.0  22.0 
Refugees landed in Canada   7,204  2.8  31.5 
Refugee dependants     3,181  1.3  13.9 
Sub-total    22,846 9.0  100.0 
        
Total     241,544 na na 
        
Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Facts and Figures, 2009.    
NOTE: At April 1, 2009, Statistics Canada estimated Canada's population to be 33,988,000,   




Appendix table 2 
Table A2 - Employment Outcomes for Oct 2000 to Sept 2001 Arrivals        




(PA)  (%) 
Skilled 
Worker 
(S&D)        
(%) 
Other 
Economic   
(%) 





          
          
Panel 1 ‐ Employment to Population Ratio        
Wave 1 - 6 months after 
arrival 
41 62  36 29  22  45 
Wave 2 - 2 years after arrival  50  74  53  51  45  59 
Wave 3 - 4 years after arrival  55  84  65  62  56  68 
            
Panel 2 ‐ Full and Part‐Time Employment Among the Employed     
Wave 1: Six months after landing           
Immigrants currently 
employed 
17,373 34,072  14,444  2,829 2,155 71,693 
Full time  77  87  70  74  69  80 
Part time  23  13  30  26  31  20 
Wave 2: Two years after 
landing 
         
Full time  79  88  68  69  63  80 
Part time  20  11  31  30  36  20 
Wave 3: Four Years after landing           
Full time  81  91  73  69  71  82 
Part time  19  8  26  30  28  17 
            
Panel 3 ‐ Self‐Assessed Employment Situation at 4 Years compared to 2 Years   
Better 55  41  43  39  60  45 
The Same  25  27  24  35  19  26 
Worse 20  32  33  25  20  29 
          
Panel 4 ‐ Retrospective/Cumulative Employment 4 Years After Arrival    
Had a job or business at               
     some point since arrival  72  96  85  77  75  84 
Number of Jobs Held Since Arrival Among Those Who Held a Job at Some Point      
1 34  30  35  54  42  34 
2 32  33  31  27  30  32 
3 19  21  19  10  17  19 
4 or more  15  16  14  9  11  15 
          
Source: From Xue (2010) using the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada     
 